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ACCEPTABLE  COMPROMISE IN THE GATT?
Glen C.W. Ames
Abstract  agreement on the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
A model of the political  economy of agricultural  tions at the December 1990 Brussels meetings.  In-
policy formulation was used to analyze the current  deed, the accusations against the Community are so
stalemate  in the  Uruguay  Round  of  Multilateral  frequent and strident that they could be called "EC
Trade Negotiations.  The combination of social wel-  bashing."  Drazek  and  Paggi,  lobbyists  for  the
fare increasing and transferring policies in the Euro-  American Farm Bureau, clearly placed the blame for
pean Community and the U.S.  is one of the primary  the breakdown in negotiations  on the EC.  "Failure
causes  of the  deadlock  in trade  negotiations.  The  was snatched from the jaws of success by the Euro-
Community's farm policy of high internal price sup-  pean  Community  ....The  intransigent  position  of
ports,  limited  market  access,  and export subsidies  those representing European agriculture signaled an
represents  short-term  equilibria  in  the market  for  unsuccessful conclusion to the troubled talks.  The
social-welfare  policies which distribute benefits  to  EC refused  multiple requests from many countries
producers  at the expense of consumers and taxpay-  to engage in meaningful negotiations  ..." (p. 34).
ers. Thus, the opportunity for internal reform of the  Drazek and Paggi's prescription for success in the
CAP leading to a compromise in the GATT negotia-  GATT talks hinges on (1) internal EC pressures from
tions is problematic at best.  However, international  non-agricultural  interests to "save the trade round,"
commitments to agricultural policy reform will force  and  (2) political  commitments to  EC farmers  that
the  Community  to  make  concessions  which  will  their incomes will be protected in some acceptable
bring equivalent change in domestic policy.  fashion.  EC  flexibility  on agricultural  support is
termed "minimal at best."
Key words:  Uruguay round  of Multilateral Trade  The U.S.  took a strong adversarial position in the
Negotiations,  interantional trade,  Uruguay Round from the very beginning.  Its initial
GATT  free trade proposal  was viewed by the EC  as "ex-
~~~~~~~~~~A  lhu  gclu  r  pl  treme and unacceptable."  Thus, each side found the
Although agricultural  trade policy reform consti-  other's proposal unacceptable, ultimately leading to
tutes  only  a small  part of the Uruguay  Round of  the suspension of the trade negotiations on Decem-
Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  (MTN)  under  the  ber 7, 1990.  Even as the talks resumed, fundamental
auspicies  of  the  GATT,  it  has  become  a  serious  differences  in the two positions remained.  Unless
stumbling  block to concluding  a trade  agreement.  differences  between the U.S.  and EC over agricul-
Farmers,  producer  associations, and politicians are  tural  internal support,  export subsidies,  market ac-
reluctant to give up border protection on agricultural  cess, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures can be
commodities,  reform  internal  support  policies,  or  resolved,  agriculture will remain a major stumbling
eliminate export subsidies; hence the GATT negotia-  block to the successful  conclusion  of the Uruguay
tions are at a stalemate.  Solutions to this impasse are  Round of MTN.
grounded  in the  complex  systems  of  agricultural  The objectives  of this paper  were  to: (1) briefly
policies designed to support farm income in the U.S.  review  the  theoretical  basis  of the social-welfare
and European Community (EC).  enhancing  and transferring policies  in the agricul-
The  European  Community's  Common  Agricul-  tural  sector  as  they  apply  to  the  impasse  in  the
tural Policy  (CAP) is one of the most complex sys-  Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations;
tems of farm support among the developed countries.  (2) review the status of agricultural policy reform in
The European Community has been blamed repeat-  the U.S. and  EC as it applies to the trade negotia-
edly for  the failure  of the negotiators  to reach an  tions; (3) analyze selected components of  the current
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163U.S. -EC trade dispute in a political economy frame-  specific sector.  The U.S. is a prime example with its
work;  and  (4) suggest areas  for potential  compro-  "free  trade"  agenda  alternatively  being  supported
mise in the Uruguay  Round of GATT negotiations  and opposed by various agricultural, commercial, or
for agriculture.  taxpayer lobbies  with narrow special interest agen-
das.
JOINT POLICY APPROACH TO PUBLIC
POLICY DEVELOPMENT  AGRICULTURAL  PROTECTIONISM
Models of the political economy of policy formu-  AND ASSOCIATED  COSTS
lation may help  explain the stalemate in the  GATT  Agricultural protectionism has its origin in govern-
negotiations.  Current food and agricultural policies  ment's response to agriculture's  declining share  of
represent short-term  equilibria in the political/eco-  the national economy.  During periods of economic
nomic markets for social-welfare  policies  (Rausser  growth, agriculture's share of economic activity de-
and Foster).  In Rausser and Foster's model of politi-  cines, since  the income  elasticity  of demand  for
cal economy, governments  seek to maximize their  food is less than that for nonfood items (Anderson).
support from social groups through a combination of  Moreover, agricultural productivity growth results in
social-welfare  increasing  (PERTs)  and  welfare-  a  downward  pressure  on  commodity  prices,  farm
transferring policies (PESTs).  income,  and  employment  relative  to  the nonfarm
Food and fiber "...  policies are in place,  in part,  sector.  To  avoid agriculture's  having  a declining
because they serve the interest of those with relative  share of economic activity, government policy ". ..
political  power and influence"  (Rausser and Foster  requires either a strong bias in productivity growth
p. 642).  These policies are available to governments  towards the farm sector ...  and/or a heavy distortion
to maximize their support through manipulation  of  of  incentives  towards  agriculture"  (Anderson  p.
consumer and producer welfare.  For a mathematical  195).  These incentives  consist of a broad portfolio
presentation of this manipulation process, the reader  of PERTs  and PESTs that became increasingly ex-
should refer directly to Rausser and Foster.  pensive in the 1980s.
In their analytical framework,  PESTs are policies  The U.S. and the EC have vigorously pursued price
designed  to  redistribute  wealth  from  one  social  policies designed to arrest the decline in agriculture's
group to another while PERTs  are policies that re-  share of employment,  exports,  and income.  Their
duce transaction costs  in the private sector by cor-  policies have resulted in runaway  budgetary costs,
recting  market  failures  or providing  public goods;  imbalances  in world  agricultural  markets,  and  an
e.g., environmental and conservation  programs, new  escalation  of trade  conflicts  among  major  trading
agricultural  technology,  research,  and  extension.  partners.  The taxpayer costs  of agricultural support
PERTs are neutral with respect to their distributional  in the U.S.  and EC became  the catalysts for GAIT
effects.  That is, large or small farmers have access  proposals to reform internal support measures.  Gov-
to the same technology.  The  aggregate  effect of  ernments have responded with various reform pro-
these public goods on agriculture may be an increase  posals to reduce taxpayer costs.  Farm lobbyists have
in both producers' and consumers' welfare.  How-  countered  with support  or opposition to the MTN
ever,  the market  effect of these PERTs may reduce  depending  upon  perceived  welfare  gains  or losses
producers' welfare as new technology shifts the sup-  from a change in agricultural protection.
ply of farm products,  resulting  in a decline in pro-
ducer prices and farm income assuming no change
in demand.  AGRICULTURAL  SUPPORT POLICIES IN
In this model of political economy, government is  THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MTN
recognized  as  a  dynamic  institution  with  its own  The agricultural  support policies of both the U.S.
agenda in addition to its role as a locus of distribu-  and EC have been manipulated during the Uruguay
tional struggles (De Janvry and Sadoulet).  The lob-  Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  Both the
bying effort by producers, consumers, taxpayers, or  U.S. and EC responded to farm policy crises during
other political groups in response to changes in their  the 1980s.  The farm financial crisis of 1982-1983 in
welfare can be the catalyst that  the government needs  the U.S. preceded the start of the Uruguay Round of
to  change transfer  mechanisms  to  more economi-  MTN, while the budget crisis  in the EC coincided
cally  efficient  combinations  of policies.  Govern-  with the initiation of the GATT negotiations.  The
ments,  as  the  contracting  parties  in the  Uruguay  passage  of the  1990  farm bill  (Food, Agriculture,
Round of MTN, certainly have their own agenda for  Conservation and Trade Act of 1990) and the estab-
the GATT negotiations larger than the needs of one  lishment of the budget stabilizer package in the EC
164(February  1988)  were  influenced  by  the  ongoing  positions in its agricultural support programs, all of
GATT negotiations,  the budget deficit crisis in the  which  influence its  position  and proposals  in the
U.S., and the rising cost of the Common Agricultural  Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Policy. The 1990 farm bill continues the market-ori-  These  include  the  annual  price  support  package,
ented  approach  and  aggressive  export  assistance  conflicting  interpretations  of the  1988  ceiling  on
contained in the previous farm bill (The Food Secu-  farm spending, the Agriculture Commission's CAP
rity Act of 1985.)  Changes in the domestic support  reform initiative, and the EC's GATT position itself.
policies in the U.S. and EC represent only short-term  Each proposal impacts the set of PERTs and PESTs
welfare adjustments while the potential outcome of  that  enhance  and  transfer  welfare to  the EC's 9.4
the GATT negotiations represent long-term shifts in  million farmers (Herlihy and Weiss).
consumer, producer, and taxpayer welfare.
The  EC's  agricultural  policies  have  objectives  CAP Budget Costs
similar to those in other industrialized  economies.  In the mid 1980s, the cost of farm support triggered
The Treaty of Rome, which set up the EC, explicitly  the process  of CAP reform.  The February,  1988,
mandated  a common  agricultural policy  with spe-  European  Council's  supply  management  agree-
cific objectives to: (1) increase farm productivity,  (2)  ment-to  limit CAP  spending,  establish production
ensure a fair living standard for farmers, (3) stabilize  quotas,  limit price support increases,  and penalize
agricultural markets,  and (4) guarantee stable food  overproduction  with co-responsibility  levies-was
supplies at reasonable  prices to  consumers  (Euro-  only a short-term  measure and did not address the
pean  Communities  Commission  1987,  Article  39,  fundamental cause of the budget crisis.
pp.  155-156).  The EC has developed  its widely-  European  Community  spending  on  agricultural
known  system  of  internal  price  supports,  border  price and income  support  climbed steadily  during
protection,  food  stocks,  and  export  subsidies  to  the 1980s, reaching  a peak of 28.9 bn ECU ($34.1
achieve its objectives.  "Together with rapid techno-  bn) in  1988,  as  domestic production responded  to
logical  progress  in  agriculture,  . . . [the Common  high support prices (USDA).  Thus, intervention ac-
Agricultural Policy] has stimulated EC food produc-  tivities  (government  commodity  stock purchases)
tion well beyond self-sufficiency in many commodi-  and export refunds accounted for more than 80 per-
ties,  creating  expensive  surpluses  and  distorting  cent of CAP expenditures (Figure  1).  Surplus com-
international  commodity  markets"  (Moyer  and  modities,  mainly  cereals  (Figure  2)  were  either
Josling,  p. 25).  Thus, the EC entered the Uruguay  disposed of on world markets or placed in storage.
Round of  Multilateral Trade Negotiations faced with  The budget stabilizer agreement came into force in
internal pressures to curtail the high cost of the CAP  1988 as the heads of government imposed a ceiling
and conflicts  with its trading  partners over market  on Community  spending  for agriculture.  In  1991,
access and subsidized competition in world markets.  however, another budget crisis developed because of
The public choice paradigm explains the resistance  the overproduction of cereals, beef, butter, and skim
to reforms in the U.S.  and the EC and predicts that  milk powder;  thus the EC  Commission  estimated
individuals,  in  this  case  farm  organizations,  are  that CAP costs would exceed the budget ceiling of
likely to  commit resources  to influence the policy  32.511 bn ECU ($39 bn).
process in direct proportion to the degree to which  The stabilizer  agreement,  approved by the Euro-
their interests  are  at stake  (Moyer and  Josling,  p.  pean Council, imposed a strict limit on the growth of
206).  "Price support  policies in both  the EC and  agricultural spending  at 74 percent of GNP growth.
USA  create  large  rents  and  financial  interests  for  Thus,  agricultural support was tied directly to eco-
farmers, which they have a strong interest in mobi-  nomic performance  in the Community  (Moyer and
lizing to protect"  (Moyer and  Josling).  Certainly,  Josling).  If economic growth slowed down, agricul-
resources have been marshalled  by farm organiza-  tural expenditures would have to be adjusted accord-
tions in the EC and U.S. to protect the PESTs in their  ingly.  Predicting  the annual  cost  of the  CAP is
respective systems.  Price supports remain relatively  difficult due to the random elements in agricultural
high, border protection remains in place, and export  supply and demand.  The Commission's estimates of
subsidies are widely used to dispose of surpluses.  CAP costs for  1991/92 indicated  that expenditures
would  exceed  the  budget  ceiling  and  hence  this
estimate precipitated the crisis over the 1991 annual
THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY  p  suportoposals
CRISIS OF 1990-91 AND TRADE ISSUES  Mr.  David Roberts, the Commission's deputy-di-
The European Community  is caught in a web of  rector general for agriculture,  argues that it is incor-
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Figure 1.  CAP Expenditure by Support Mechanism
Source:  USDA,  Western  Europe Agriculture  and Trade  Report, RS-90-4.  Nov. 1990 and Commission  of the European
Communities.
crisis  on the 1988  stabilizers policy.  He states that  CAP reform in July to the Council of Ministers and
"When the heads of government agreed [to]  budget  the European Parliament  (Commission of the Euro-
discipline and the stabilizers, they signalled  clearly  pean Communities,  March  1, 1991).  Thirdly, both
that  the  problem  of imbalance between growing  the annual price package debate  and the long-term
agriculturalproductivity  and static  demand  could  no  reform proposals came into public debate as efforts
longer be resolved by ever growing  exports at ever  to restart the GATT negotiations were under way.  A
increasing budgetary costs.  The stabilizers package  brief review  of these issues illustrates  the primary
was, however,  incomplete because it did not explic-  reasons  why  change  and compromise  are exceed-
itly confront the problem of [the gap between] grow-  ingly difficult in the EC.
ing productivity  and static  demand"  [italics  mine]  The  Council  of Ministers  ultimately  approved  a
(Agra Europe, March 1, 1991, p. P/3).  Thus, the EC  farm price support package in late May  1991  con-
Commission's  proposal  for  radical  reform  in  the  taining cuts in the nominal support prices for beef,
CAP placed additional  limits on the supply side.  It  milk and  cereals,  an increase  in the cereals  co-re-
also shifted the CAP focus to social objectives such  sponsibility  levy  (a tax on over-quota  production)
as maintaining  the rural  environment  and shifting  from 3 percent to 5 percent, a 2 percent reduction in
production away from intensive farming to extensive  milk  quotas,  a  1.5  percent  cut  in the  guaranteed
systems.  Direct income aids would be used to pro-  prices for oilseeds and protein crops, and a substan-
tect the incomes  of cereal  and livestock producers  tial  reduction  in  the EC  support  for  the  tobacco
(Agra Europe, January 25,  1991).  regime depending on the variety (Agra  Europe, May
31, 1991).  A special one-year land set-aside scheme
The  1991 Csis  of  e CAP  was introduced as an interim measure to control the
Three important fiscal issues dominated the Coun-  CAP cost.  In the view of EC-wide farm and coop-
cil's debate over the crisis of the CAP in 1991.  First,  erative associations  (COPA/COGECA),  these price
estimates of the cost  of the  1991/92  CAP budget  proposals represented a renewed threat to declining
indicated  that the expenditure ceiling would be ex-  farm incomes.
ceeded unless'constraints were placed on the annual  On July 5,  1991, EC  Agriculture Commissioner,
support price package.  Secondly, the EC Commis-  Ray  MacSharry,  released  the details  of his  often-
sion  submitted  its  formal  proposal  for  long-term  leaked CAP reform proposals.  The axiom in public
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choice theory that complex policies promote policy  levy on excess cereal production over the maximum
inertia and incrementalism  is substantiated in Mac-  guaranteed  quantity  will be abolished.  Individual
Sharry's proposals.  The basic principles and instru-  producers will be compensated  for their loss of in-
ments  of the  CAP for  cereals  were maintained  in  come through direct compensatory  payments equal
MacSharry's  plan;  however,  he  proposed  cuts  in  to the  difference  between  the current  target price
target prices by  35 percent  over  three  years,  with  (155  ECU/mt  or $221/mt)  and the  reduced target
income support paid on a sliding scale so that small  prices.  These annual compensatory payments have
farmers would be fully compensated for their loss of  been  fixed  at 25,  35,  and 45  ECUs/mt,  for  three
income.  A 15 percent acreage set-aside program was  successive marketing  years provided producers set
also  included  as a  supply  control  measure  (Agra  aside 15 percent of their arable land.  Compensation
Europe July 5, 1991).  Environmental  programs and  for set-aside  land will be based  on average yields,
early retirement payments were also included in his  stipulated in separate regulations (See Council of the
proposal.  In  summary  MacSharry's  CAP reform  European  Communities,  May  1992; Agra Europe,
proposals were designed to protect EC farm income  May 22,  1992).
through a complex  system of decoupled  payments  Complex changes in livestock sector policies were
and environmental support mechanisms.  included  in the CAP reforms.  Ceilings on beef in-
tervention purchases  were to be reduced 53 percent
AGREEMENT  ON THE REFORM OF THE  through  1997  and price supports were to be cut 15
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY  percent over three years.  Milk quotas would remain
In May  1992, after lengthy negotiations  and by a  unchanged but subject to annual review.  Butter sup-
qualified majority, the Council of Agriculture Min-  port prices would be cut 2.5 percent per year for two
isters reached  agreement  on the reform of the CAP  years  (1994-95),  while  prices  for  skimmed  milk
based on  a compromise  put forward by  the Portu-  powder would remain unchanged.  Even with these
guese Presidency to the EC's (MacSharry's) original  price cuts,  discrimination  against fresh milk prod-
proposal.  The  main  features  of the compromise  ucts remains, leading to surplus production of butter
agreement are as  follows:  By 1997,  EC price sup-  andmilkpowdersogreatthatinterventionpurchases
ports will be cut 29 percent for grains,  15 percent for  of dairy products, mainly butter and skim milk pow-
beef, and 5 percent for butter.  The co-responsibility  der, exceeded 3.3 billion ECU in  1992, accounting
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production.  The total cost of the EC dairy program  related to the volume of production, factors of pro-
is in excess of 5 billion ECU per year.  duction, domestic or international  prices, nor shall
In  reality  the CAP  reforms  were  only minimal  production  be  required  to receive  such  payments.
changes  in the EC's system of relatively high price  The CAP reform agreement preserves compensatory
supports,  border  protection,  and export  subsidies.  payments,  but  they  are  linked to  production.  "In
Indeed, the principle  of EC preference  remains in-  order to be entitled to compensatory payments, each
tact,  with the  minimum  import price  for grain,  or  producer should submit annually  an application set-
threshold price, fixed at 45 ECU/mt higher than the  ting out:  (a) surfaces sown with arable crops  [and]
target price for  cereals.  The variable  levy system  (b) surfaces left in set-aside" (Agra Europe, May 22,
also remains unchanged.  Furthermore,  export sub-  1992).  The set-aside area must equal  15  percent in
sidies are  still needed  to dispose of EC surpluses.  order for farmers to qualify for payments.  The EC
Compensatory  set-asides  greater  than  15  percent  insists that its decoupled compensatory income pay-
would be needed to bring the EC's surpluses down  ments remain in the "green box" and are not subject
to the 22 mmt,  considered  acceptable  in Dunkel's  to further reductions.
GATT proposals (Agra Europe, July  17,  1992).  The new EC oilseeds policy provides a test case of
the "adjustments" needed to bridge the gap between
the CAP  reforms  and  Dunkel's Compromise  pro-
COST OF THE REFORMED CAP  posal. The new EC oilseeds policy switches support
The budgetary costs of the reformed CAP continue  away  from crushing  aids  (processor payments  to
to rise.  In nominal terms, estimated  CAP price and  compensate for high priced EC oilseeds)  to direct
income support costs will increase from  35  billion  income subsidies paid on a yield per-hectare  basis.
ECU in 1993 to 43.5 billion ECU in 1997 (Figure 3).  Farmers would receive the market price plus a direct
However,  EC farm  lobbyists  have strongly  argued  subsidy payment. The value of the direct payment,
that real  farm  income  will not improve  under  the  which varies inversely with the world price, ensures
CAP reforms and they have protested the anticipated  farmers that their income  will  continue  to be pro-
cuts in farm income (Agra Europe, May 29,  1992).  tected  from  world  price  declines  (Agra  Europe,
Farm  lobbies  increased  the pressure  for  national  January  17,  1992).  However,  the EC's oilseeds re-
income  aids  to  preserve  farm  income.  Indeed,  gime is embroiled in a controversy with the U.S. in
French  farmers  have  succeeded  in  securing  tax  a GATT dispute over the level of support provided
breaks, credit concessions,  disaster relief, and other  to EC farmers.
subsidies from their government which the national
farmers union considers compensation for the "dam-  THE SECTION 301 OILSEEDS CASE
age" caused by the CAP reforms (Agra Europe, May  In December  1987, the American Soybean Asso-
29,  1992).  ciation filed a Section 301  Petition with the United
In summary, the CAP reforms were a minimalist  States  Trade Representative  (USTR)  claiming  that
approach to curtailing rising budgetary costs. While  the EC's oilseeds subsidies violated its GATT obli-
price supports were cut and supply control measures  gations. In December 1989, a GATT panel found that
were instituted, only minimal changes were made in  the EC's oilseeds  subsidies were  inconsistent  with
the dairy program.  The reforms preserve the com-  the GATT, because  the subsidies  nullified and im-
plexity of the farm policy, and will require substan-  paired  the  EC's  zero-duty  bindings  on  oilseeds
tial monitoring  and verification  of new set-asides  granted to the U.S. in 1962 (Danforth 1992).
and environmental programs  . Even these CAP re-  In  January  1990,  the EC  formally  accepted  the
forms, however,  may have strengthened the CAP's  findings of the first GATT panel and agreed to make
position in the multilateral trade negotiations.  the necessary reforms  in its oilseeds policies effec-
tive with the  1991  crop year.  After some delay, the
CAP REFORM AND  GATT NEGOTIATIONS  EC  Council  of Agriculture Ministers  adopted  the
CAP reform proposals must be considered  in the  new subsidy plan (payments to producers  on a per-
context of an EC commitment to reduce agricultural  hectare basis rather than the old subsidy payment to
protection  in the Uruguay  Round of MTN.  They  oilseed crushers).  The new oilseed subsidy guaran-
have become  implicitly  linked to  GATT Director-  teed EC farmers a return of approximately  $13 per
General Arthur Dunkel's compromise proposal for  bushel, or twice the world market price for oilseeds.
agriculture  (Summary details can be found in Agra  The  U.S.  Senate  became  involved  in  the  trade
Europe,  Jan. 3, 1992).  Dunkel's proposal establishes  dispute in October  1991  when it voted 97-0 to urge
five criteria defining permissible decoupled income  the USTR to file a second action under Section 301
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regarding the GATT ruling. The second GATT panel  on the principle  of compensating  producers  on a
addressed the question of whether the new EC oil-  product-specific basis for  the reduction  of market
seeds  regime,  adopted  in  October  1991,  met  the  support due to the reciprocal exchange of tariff con-
requirements of the first GATT panel decision (Dan-  cessions  in  the proposed  GATT  agreement.  The
forth 1992). In March 1992, the second GATT panel  difference between the oilseeds case and other com-
ruled the new oilseeds regime incompatible with the  modities is, of course, that zero tariff bindings do not
Community's  GATT  obligations  (Agra  Europe,  exist for other products.  Thus, the EC would reject
March 20, 1992).  any Uruguay Round  agreement which does not ac-
The Community's  offer of compensation  under  cept the principles of compensatory payments.
Article  XXVIII of the GATT has been rejected  by
the U.S. because the offer did not specifically com-
pensate the injured party, soybean farmers, for their  AREAS FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN U.S.
alleged  losses.  Under  Article  28,  signatories  are  AND EC IN URUGUAY ROUND OF MTN
bound either to reform the offending practices or to  Several obstacles  still exist before an agreement
offer compensation; failure to do so allows the dam-  can be reached  between the U.S.  and the EC in the
aged party to seek retaliation through its own trade  Uruguay Round. The primary issues are rebalancing,
regulation mechanisms. The U.S. retaliated by pub-  the volume of subsidized exports, the acceptance  of
lishing a provisional  list of $2 billion worth of EC  the EC's compensatory  payments,  and the  level of
products, including wines, cheeses, beers, and other  market access in a GATT agreement.  Nevertheless,
products, targeted for prohibitive tariffs of 100 per-  the CAP reform agreement may provide the neces-
cent or more (Agra Europe, June  12, 1992). The EC  sary catalyst to a political agreement in the Uruguay
has extended the conflict into the GATT negotiations  Round.
by insisting  on a check  of the U.S.'s right  to take  Closely aligned with the Section 301 oilseeds case
unilateral retaliatory  action against its trading part-  is the concept of rebalancing.  The EC argues that in
ners, such as the countervailing  duties imposed un-  exchange for market access concessions  on cereals
der the  301  oilseeds case  (Agra Europe, July  31,  under  a  Uruguay  Round  agreement,  it  should be
1992).  allowed to raise protection on non-grain feedstuffs
The second GATT Oilseeds Panel Report calls into  such as corn gluten feed, maize germ meal, and citrus
question the underlying  principle  of the EC's CAP  pulp. The U.S.  argues  that not only  is rebalancing
reform of the cereals sector.  The reform was based  counter to the spirit of the Uruguay Round of MTN
169but it also negates the zero-tariff binding negotiated  "green box" decoupled payments in that they are not
in 1962.  Rebalancing  was  explicitly omitted from  tied tofuture levels of production. Thus, they are less
Dunkel's text but it remains an implicit problem area  likely to stimulate production and distort world mar-
that could be resolved by U.S.-EC bilateral negotia-  kets than other forms of existing payments.
tions outside of the GATT.  The market  access issue has been  only partially
Both the U.S. and the EC have widely used volun-  addressed by the CAP reforms. Threshold prices or
tary  export  restraints  (VERs)  to  limit  imports of  minimum  import prices  have  been  cut by almost
textiles, steel, automobiles, tapioca, and other goods  one-third  through  1997,  thus  making  imports
that threaten their domestic producers. The bargain-  cheaper.  However, EC preference is still maintained
ing power of the respective contracting  parties may  as discussed  previously.  The EC  argues that mini-
explain policy-makers' preference for a VER on U.S.  mum access has been achieved via lower minimum
exports of corn gluten feed, maize germ meal, and  import prices, while other contracting parties like the
citrus pulp to the EC as a solution to the EC's demand  U.S. have neither offered nor implemented  signifi-
for  rebalancing protection  on imports of non-feed  cant market access concessions.  The EC has clearly
grain  substitutes.  The  U.S.  could  "voluntarily"  strengthened its position in the negotiating process
agree to limit exports of byproducts of the wet corn  by concluding a "reform" of its domestic agricultural
milling and citrus processing, and in return the U.S.  policy prior to bargaining over a multilateral agree-
would receive  a boost  in total  farm  exports  (esti-  ment. Flexible policy mechanisms now exist in the
mated at $4-5 billion)  under tariffication  proposals  CAP that  would  allow  adjustment  to  an  external
of the final GATT  agreement.  As an example  of a  GATT agreement without changing the overall pol-
VER, the EC Commission has proposed an annual  icy framework.  This has been a primary objective of
tariff-quota duty of 6 percent on corn gluten imports,  EC  negotiations  since  the  beginning  of  Uruguay
up to  4.5 mmt,  equivalent to  95.7  percent of U.S.  Round of MTN.
exports to the Community  in  1990  (Agra Europe,
January  17, 1992).  While producers' associations in  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
the U.S. would be expected to oppose any VER that  The CAP reforms have given the EC farm policy
limited their commodity-specific market access, the  several  characteristics  similar  to those of the U.S.
distribution of gains  in  other areas  among several  farm program.  Both target and intervention prices
interest groups could lead to an acceptable compro-  have been fixed for three years  in advance.  Thus,
mise.  there is less opportunity for the farm lobby to exert
Arthur Dunkel's draft plan for settlement of the  pressure on the Council of Ministers during annual
Uruguay  Round called for  a 36 percent  cut in  EC  price fixing. Also, the level of compensatory income
export  subsidies  and a 24 percent  reduction in the  payments have been fixed for three years.  Regula-
volume  of subsidized exports.  While the CAP  re-  tions stipulating  which crops can be grown on set-
forms  do not specifically  contain cuts  adequate  to  aside land are similar to the rules governing the use
reach Dunkel's objectives, the mechanisms now ex-  of conservation reserve acres in the 1990 farm bill.
ist to reduce both the value and volume of EC subsi-  Since farmers have considerable discretion over use
dized exports.  Intervention prices for cereals have  of set-aside  acreage,  the  same  uncertainty  exists
been cut through  1997,  which reduces  the gap be-  surrounding their production decisions as in the U.S.
tween world market prices and EC prices,  thus re-  The outlook for a final GATT agreement on agricul-
ducing the cost of subsidization.  Second, set-asides  ture hinges on the direction and extent of reform of
will reduce the volume of surplus production. More-  the Common Agricultural Policy and the response of
over, the reform agreement specifically provides for  the U.S. to the progress,  or the lack thereof, of the
annual set-aside adjustments.  Since Dunkel's draft  negotiations  on the key  issues of export subsidies,
plan is only a basis for negotiations, the final cuts in  internal support, and market access.
subsidized exports can be achieved through the bi-  The political economy  models, discussed earlier,
lateral bargaining process.  provide  a useful framework  to analyze  the reform
The essential role of the EC's compensatory pay-  proposals and their linkage to the multilateral trade
ments is an income subsidy to facilitate the orderly  negotiations.  The most useful components include:
adjustment to the EC's new, lower market prices.  Do  (1) complexity and reform, and  (2) the role of cata-
the payments meet the criteria for decoupled income  lysts in the bargaining process.
support exemptions  as stipulated in Dunkel's draft
plan?  Probably  not,  because  they  are  related  to  Complexity  and  Reform.  Moyer  and  Josling
specific commodities  and a base period of produc-  (1990) argue that policy complexity leads to inertia
tion. Nevertheless, these payments may approximate  and incrementalism in reform proposals.  The CAP
170reform  agreement  contains  only  incremental  may lead to incremental  changes in the portfolio of
changes in the support mechanisms, although they  PESTs and PERTs that supports agriculture in both
appear  at first to contain  drastic  cuts in price,  and  the EC and the U.S.  Despite the pressure to main-
hence income support, for EC farmers.  MacSharry's  tain the welfare-transferring  policies in the Commu-
proposals and the Agriculture Ministers' final agree-  nity, shifts in Community policies toward structural
ment follow  a  well  established  scenario  for  a re-  guidance  and  environmental  programs  (the Guid-
sponse  to  a  crisis  in  agriculture  generated  by  ance Section of the EAGGF budget) will require a
over-production:  cut commodity prices, reduce the  different mix of social welfare transferring policies.
agricultural  resource base,  and export the surplus.  The portfolio  of PESTs will change  as agriculture
The reform agreement adds to the complexity of an  adjusts  to  different  socio-economic  objectives.
already intricate  CAP  policy.  The criteria for  set-  These include extensive agriculture versus intensive
aside  compensation  are  complex  while  there  are  farming, rural development in less-favored regions,
manifold regulations governing  set-aside land use.  environmental protection, and recreational land use.
The structure  of the bargaining  process  changes
Catalysts  and  the  Reform  Process.  Moyer  and  slowly.  Governments and interest groups operating
Josling  hypothesize  that  only  a crisis  such as the  in an arena of constant political technology generally
budget crisis of 1988 could stimulate the legislative  will not bring about reform.  The Uruguay Round of
and bureaucratic actors to overcome their basic iner-  Multilateral Trade Negotiations  is such an external
tia and resistance to change (p. 18).  The 1988budget  entity as  can provide  a  catalyst  for  reform  in the
crisis was settled by the European Council, the heads  agricultural support policies of the European Com-
of state,  rather  than  by  the Agriculture  Ministers.  munity.  EC farm lobbyists recognize that the CAP
The  price  support  crisis  of  1991  was  settled  by  reforms  have received  a certain stimulus from  the
incremental  changes  in  established  policy  mecha-  GATT negotiations. Certain U.S. commodity groups
nisms.  The success  of the CAP reform agreement  have also been threatened by the loss of their border
and the EC's GATT position hinges on either broad-  protection measures and other PESTs. If the GATT
ening the range of participants to include budgetary  negotiations  are successful,  both sides will have to
and other actors more representative of the general  "pay"  a  certain  cost  by  giving  up  some of their
community interest or shifting the locus of decision-  PESTs in exchange for other gains in agriculture and
making upward to the top political levels.  in other areas.  Certainly, the portfolio of PERTs and
The pressures for CAP reform and the implications  PESTs will not disappear after the Uruguay  Round
of the  GATT  negotiations  for agricultural  policies  of GATT, but the mixture of policies will change.
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